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Representing the Falklands Conflict
in Words and Pictures
La représentation du conflit des Malouines par le texte et par l’image
Michael Parsons
1 The Falklands conflict if 1982 was an event that generated intense interest, although
very few people were able to witness anything of what went on in the South Atlantic.
The distance, the vastness of the oceans and seas in which the naval engagements took
place, the remote nature of the terrain and the fact that many of the most significant
infantry battles took place at night, combined with the fact that there was little real
enthusiasm on the part of the military authorities for encouraging a flow of news from
the task force and from the islands, meant that hard facts were hard to come by. Facts
alone are of course not sufficient to understand what is really happening, and as in any
military  campaign  the  strategies  and  tactics  adopted  by  the  leaders  of  both  sides
remained secret. This did not stop commentators from trying to make sense of events,
but the interpretations that  this  guessing game led to were often very wide of  the
mark. So, even obtaining information about events as they unfolded in a way that made
sense of otherwise unconnected incidents was a difficult task.
2 Representation of developments in the South Atlantic was further hampered by the
difficulty experienced in obtaining pictures, even still photographs, that said anything
really significant to a general public which had become used to the idea that modern
news-gathering technology would provide a steady stream of television reports. The
absence  of  television  footage  or  graphic  photographs  to  illustrate  events  as  they
occurred  fuelled  a  sense  of  frustration  that  the  public  was  being deprived  of
information, even when the bare facts were announced by the authorities.
3 The conflict therefore generated much public debate about news coverage. It is difficult
in this context to underestimate the extent to which people feel they have not been
‘informed’  about  what  is  going  on  unless  they  have  pictures,  especially  television
pictures, to make it all feel ‘real’.
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4 The  conflict  also  offers  an  interesting  debate  about  how  events  should  be  ‘re-
presented’: how intense moments can or should be captured by artists or indeed by any
one of the protagonists or witnesses of the events and the resulting pictures hung in art
galleries, officers’ messes and other places where this form of memory is usually put on
display. There was disagreement about what it was that should be recorded and what
artistic conventions were appropriate. The Falklands conflict was recorded by the first
official war artist to join British forces since the Second World War. Expectations of
what a war artist was supposed to produce were frustrated, a situation which was to be
repeated in later conflicts, notably the war in Iraq. Alternative visions were offered by
artists  apparently feeling that the official  artist  had not used a uniquely privileged
opportunity as they would have wished.
5 There were other very different contemporary and subsequent representations of the
Falklands  war  offered  by  servicemen who  had  been  involved  and  who  used  art  to
express their pain and frustration, or by cartoonists who expressed their disquiet about
the  political  background  to  the  conflict,  though  they  have  remained  relatively
unremarked.
 
The meaning of ‘representation’
6 It is perhaps useful at this stage to look briefly at what is meant by ‘representation’ in
order to see how the problems involved in representing the Falklands conflict can shed
light on the concept itself. I am excluding the political meaning of representation from
this discussion and focussing on the issue of representation as the process of making
something present in the mind of a listener or reader. In this sense it is possible to
consider how the events of the South Atlantic in 1982 might have been misrepresented
or under-represented. The question is one of the creation of meaning, of making sense
of  ‘events’,  of  ‘constructing  discourse’.1 Representation  is  about  interpretation  and
about identifying what is significant and what is not in what can be a confusing mass of
facts. This is always problematic, but it is especially so in the context of the inevitable
‘fog of war’.
7 The Shorter Oxford Dictionary provides the following definition for the meaning of
‘representation’ which I am primarily concerned with in discussing the way historical
events are mediated and represented:
The action of placing a fact, etc., before another or others by means of discourse; a
statement of account … The action of presenting to the mind or imagination … The
act or process by which the mind forms an image or concept
and for the verb ‘to represent’:
To represent something is  to describe or depict  it,  to call  it  up in the mind by
description or portrayal or imagination; to place a likeness of it before us in our
mind or in the senses.
8 Representing  the  Falklands  conflict  therefore  involves  a  mental  process  of
constructing, or reconstructing, the ‘reality’ of what happened, making sense of it and
conjuring it up ‘realistically’ in the minds of listeners, viewers and readers. Framed in
these  terms  there  must  be  some  doubt  as  to  whether  any  attempt  to  represent  a
military conflict such as the Falklands War can ever succeed. Nobody who has not been
in a battle (and I certainly have not and hope never to be) can, I suppose, really have
the experience ‘represented’ to them. Even participants will probably have experienced
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a necessarily limited subset of the total event. And yet representation is important for
both the general public and for the servicemen and others who were caught up in the
events. The general public wants – needs – to know what is being done in its name,
especially in time of war. It wants the facts laid before it, and it wants to know what
they mean. Participants clearly experience a need to capture memories of events and
attempt  to  make  sense  of  them  in  their  own  terms.  In  both  cases  the  process
necessarily involves interpretation and selection.
9 In this article I propose to look beyond the well-documented issue of how the media
were  ‘handled’,  how  censorship  was  imposed  and  how access  to  news  and
communications facilities was restricted during the Falklands War and see first how
facts  alone  do  not  constitute  a  ‘representation’  of  what  happened,  unless  they  are
assembled into a meaningful interpretation of events. This is especially difficult when
widely-held frameworks for interpretation fail to account for the specific nature of the
events  concerned  and  lead  to  inaccurate  representations  or  complete
misrepresentations.
10 I then propose to look at the issue of photographic and artistic representations of the
war,  and  the  different  and  even  conflicting  goals  photographers,  newspapers  and
artists have pursued in their attempts to represent the Falklands in pictorial form. I
will suggest that in many cases what is shown is more a re-hash of previous conflicts,
moulding the current events to fit pre-existing narratives of what a war is supposed to
be like,  than a  genuine attempt to  portray or  depict  what  it  was  really  like.  I  will
further  suggest  that  representations  which  do  not  fit  into  those  pre-established
patterns are likely to be given much less prominence than those that do.
11 Finally I will very briefly comment on the way that heroes are part of the narrative of
any conflict, and that in many cases the acts of heroism they accomplished recall those
of earlier conflicts.
 
The facts do not speak for themselves
12 The first of the definitions of representation reproduced above refers to ‘placing a fact
before another or other by means of discourse’. In the Falklands war even this degré
zéro de la représentation presented major challenges. Access to the theatre of war was
strictly controlled by the two belligerents, forms of vetting or censorship were applied
on both sides and the ability to transmit any kind of material was seriously constrained
by the shortage of  transmission facilities throughout most of  the conflict.  This was
most  obviously  a  handicap  for  the  television  journalists.  For  (probably)  mainly
technical  reasons  it  was  never  possible  to  transmit  television  footage  via  satellite.
Television material therefore had to be taken back physically, and a substantial part of
the journey, at least as far as Ascension Island, had to be made by ship. Image transfer
time was therefore measured not in megabytes per second but in knots.
13 This frustrated the expectations which had been raised among war correspondents in
the aftermath of the Vietnam War, during which journalists had had unprecedented –
and possibly unique – access to the battlefield. To all intents and purposes they had had
unlimited  access  to  the  scene  of  the  action,  and  produced  dramatic  reports,
photographs and film. However, they did not yet have access to the Electronic News
Gathering (ENG) technology which was developed during the latter part of the 1970s
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and  film  had  to  be  flown  back  to  the  United  States.  By  the  early  1980s,  satellite
transmission  technology  had  made  substantial  advances  and  it  was  thought  that
pictures  of  any  ‘modern’  war  would  be  made  very  rapidly  available.  There  was  an
expectation that ‘news’ (which was increasingly being taken to mean video pictures)
would be coming out in a regular and rapid stream.
14 Most comment about news coverage of the Falklands war concentrated on this issue.
Relations between the media and the authorities became so strained and criticism so
vocal that a parliamentary enquiry was announced even before the conflict had come
to an end and the enquiry itself  was held shortly afterwards.  It  gives a  fascinating
insight into the expectations of the media, the goals of the politicians and the mindset
of the military – and the almost inevitable conflict of interests between them. And it is
not  only the politicians and the military that  come in for  justified criticism in the
report; the weaknesses, jealousies and sometimes disturbing egotism of some of the
journalists emerge clearly. The most serious complaint made by the ‘print’ journalists
was that their copy was sometimes held up for a few hours and therefore missed the
deadlines for the following day’s paper. In the meantime the ultra-bland but largely
accurate (if rather terse) briefings given by the Ministry of Defence in London meant
that much of the news obtained by the journalists on the spot was rendered useless
because it did not reach their offices in time. Almost perversely, the messages were so
bland, especially those read by the MoD spokesman Ian McDonald, that many listeners
assumed that the news was being massaged or at least sanitised, even when it was not.
15 All of this raises serious questions about what news is and about what the role of the
journalist on the spot should be. And even if the ‘simple facts’, if there is such a thing,
could be established, did they ‘make sense’ without a clear understanding of the logic
behind  them?  The  Falklands  war  provides  perhaps  a  little-noticed  example  of  a
phenomenon  which  became  much  more  obvious  with  later  wars,  when  24-hour
television provided a flow of pictures, and yet the audience only got a very partial view
of  what  was  really  going  on.  In  the  end,  the  Gulf  War  stressed  the  importance  of
analysis and interpretation, and demonstrated that merely showing ‘events’ happening
(whatever might be meant by an ‘event’ or indeed by ‘happening’) was not enough –
and indeed could arguably be presented as a regressive development, with the meaning
of  what  was  happening  being  overwhelmed  in  a  flood  of  unprocessed  ‘facts’  and
pictures.  The  importance  of  seeing  individual  events  within  the  right  analytical
framework is admirably illustrated by one of the military engagements of the Falklands
War  which  remains  controversial  even  today:  the  sinking  of  the  Argentine  cruiser
General Belgrano.
 
Coverage of the Belgrano incident : the right facts, but
the wrong analytical framework
16 Britain’s response to the Argentine invasion of April 2 1982 was to send a task force,
while at the same time seeking the support of the United Nations, rapidly obtaining a
Security Council resolution (502) which required all armed forces to be withdrawn and
invited the two countries involved to initiate negotiations. Britain’s partners within the
European Economic Community, particularly France, gave their support, though some,
such as Ireland and Spain, were reluctant, and it was not clear whether that support,
expressed essentially through their willingness to impose various forms of economic
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embargo, would be sustained if Britain were to pursue the military option. Britain also
received clear messages of support and some practical assistance from the countries of
the Commonwealth.  The United States,  on the other hand,  was embarrassed at  the
prospect of a conflict between a major European ally and a country which represented
in US eyes an important bastion against Communism in Latin America and a major
asset in the campaign in El Salvador.
17 The newspapers, both in Britain and abroad, tended to interpret the development of
the military option as a gradual imposition of pressure designed to back up diplomacy.
More generally, most media comment saw the unfolding of events in the light of the
prevailing doctrine for low intensity conflicts, that of gradual escalation.2 This doctrine
was part of the theory of ‘flexible response’ which emerged in the 1950s to replace the
former  predominant  ‘philosophy’,  associated  notably  with  John  Foster  Dulles,  of
‘massive reprisals’. It allowed for military pressure to be applied gradually, in carefully
calculated steps.
18 The danger of this ‘doctrine’ is that it implies that in small-scale crises such as the
Falklands affair military ‘pressure’ can always be ‘applied’ in carefully controlled doses
according to precise political objectives. A crisis is by definition unpredictable. More
significantly, the controlled ‘application’ of ‘pressure’, while it sounds fine in theory,
may not be so easily managed in practice. In the Falklands War, neither side had a level
of military superiority such that it could ensure that every military initiative would be
at all times consistent with the political objectives at that precise time.
19 Nonetheless,  that  was  how  it  seemed  to  many  observers  as  the  month  of  April
progressed. British warships had very visibly left port on April 5; on April 12 Britain
had declared a ‘Maritime Exclusion Zone’ (MEZ) 200 miles around the islands; on April
23 Britain had warned that any vessel or aircraft deemed to be a threat to the task force
would be dealt with accordingly, and two days later, on April 25, the island of South
Georgia had been recaptured. Meanwhile, Argentina had rejected the terms drawn up
by  Alexander  Haig,  the  Secretary  of  State,  and  so  the  United  States  had  officially
announced support for Britain on April 30. That same day, Britain announced a ‘Total
Exclusion Area’ (TEZ) 200 miles around the archipelago. Some people even claimed that
the task force had been ordered to sail  deliberately slowly to allow ample time for
diplomacy,  though  this  is  largely  unfounded.3 Britain,  the  media  commented,  was
progressively ‘piling it on’, and no doubt they explicitly or implicitly saw the campaign
as  running  on  course  according  to  the  doctrine  of  gradual  escalation  and
proportionality. For example, a leading article in The Times commented, ‘[t]he policy of
gradually increasing the military pressure on the Argentine forces step by step has shown that
strength was being applied with judgement’.4
20 The media saw further gradual escalation when, in the early hours of May 1, a single
Vulcan bomber, which had left Ascension Island accompanied by a number of tanker
aircraft for in-flight refuelling, dropped a line of heavy bombs across the airfield at
Port Stanley. At dawn, a number of Harrier ‘jump jets’ took off from the aircraft carrier
HMS  Hermes and  attacked  targets  on  the  Falklands,  especially  the  airfield.  A
detachment of warships also bombarded the airfield at Stanley.
21 All of this activity was more or less accurately reported; it was widely interpreted as a
stepping up of the military pressure. It therefore came as something of a shock to the
world when the sinking of the Belgrano was announced. Public opinion was struck by
what  seemed to  many  to  have  been  an  unwarranted  and  sudden escalation  of  the
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military pressure. The gradual application and flexible response which so many people
had  identified  in  British  military  initiatives  seemed  to  have  been  suddenly  and
inexplicably  abandoned.  Casualties  had  been  thus  far  kept  low,  but  368  Argentine
sailors died after the attack on the Belgrano. That shock was further compounded when,
two days later, a British warship, HMS Sheffield, was struck by an Exocet missile, killing
twelve seamen, and emphasising the vulnerability of warships on both sides to weapons
which had not been used before in a major naval encounter. Not unreasonably, the
attack on HMS Sheffield was considered as a reprisal for the loss of the Belgrano.
22 This was the reading of events – all of which were reported at the time, reasonably
accurately and without undue delay, with the hugely important exception of the course
pursued by the Belgrano when it was sunk – and it is the interpretation which seems to
have  survived  in  most  people’s  memories.  However,  the  ‘gradual  escalation’
interpretation is largely inaccurate. The events as reported take on a quite different
meaning when they are set against the background of military strategy.
23 The military authorities had to plan right from the start for a military conclusion to the
crisis,  whether or not they believed it  could be solved by diplomacy.  After all,  one
cannot commit forces in support of diplomacy, and, if the diplomacy fails, simply turn
around and say the forces were never really intended to be used. It is nothing more
than the simple rules of calling someone’s bluff. So while the military option could be
cancelled at any moment, it had to start right from the beginning on the basis that it
would not.
24 The Chiefs of Staff had no illusions about the difficulties they faced. Indeed some of
them were not too happy about sending the task force in the first place. Such anxieties
as there were were fully borne out by events. The major difficulties were the distance at
which the  operation would  have  to  be  conducted and the  weather  conditions.  The
Falkland Islands were 8,000 miles from Britain, yet only 400 miles from Argentina. So
while  Britain’s  military  strength was  superior  to  Argentina’s,  the  relative  distances
went some considerable way towards cancelling out that advantage. The weather was
also a major headache, and the timetable was extremely tight. The Navy advised that it
would  be  impossible  to  keep  ships  operational  for  more  than  six  months  in  the
conditions of the South Atlantic, and that after three months the efficiency of the fleet
would begin to decline. Moreover, the South Atlantic winter would make many of the
operations  involved  in  establishing  a  beachhead  practically  impossible,  as  well  as
making conditions generally debilitating. That left a ‘window of opportunity’ of less
than three months. The armed forces’ logistics experts got to work and calculated that
it was just possible, but that there was no time to spare.
25 In any case, an opposed landing was an unappealing prospect at the best of times, as
Dieppe,  Normandy  and  the  island-hopping  landings  in  the  Pacific  had  amply
demonstrated during the Second World War. Without air supremacy and dominance of
the sea it  would be a seriously unattractive proposal.  Britain’s carrier strength was
limited and it did not yet have early-warning radar aircraft in the area, both of which
meant that its ability to achieve air supremacy could not be taken for granted. The task
force certainly had little room for manoeuvre: if one carrier had been sunk, then the
task force would probably have had to abandon the operation.
26 Perhaps even more significantly, this was a limited conflict, and it needed international
support to succeed, and that placed major political constraints on the military. There
was no question of authorising direct attacks against Argentina. Consequently, while
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Britain’s aircraft could be attacked on their ‘bases’, the aircraft carriers, Argentina’s
could not. Similarly, while the best part of the Royal Navy was with the task force and
susceptible to Argentine attack,  the Argentine Navy could remain in port,  only 400
miles from the war zone, without risk.
27 The  commander  of  the  task  force,  Admiral  ‘Sandy’  Woodward,  knew  that  no
amphibious landing was possible unless Argentina’s navy had been overcome. During a
landing several elements of any naval force are particularly vulnerable: the infantry
involved in the landing, and also the navy, whose vessels have to come in close and
often remain  immobile  for  relatively  long periods  of  time while  troops  transfer  to
landing vessels.
28 He also knew that the Argentine navy was fully aware of its own weaknesses, and would
only come out to battle if it believed the British forces were especially vulnerable for
one reason or another. Woodward was uncomfortably aware of the vulnerability of the
task force even without having to support an amphibious landing. He knew that the
Argentines knew the position of the force,  but he did not know where most of the
Argentine navy was. His brief, however, was to prepare the way for a landing, and he
knew he could waste no time doing it.
29 The  only  way  he  saw  of  achieving  this  was  to  draw  the  Argentine  navy  out  by
pretending  to  launch a  full-scale  landing  straight  into  the  capital  Port  Stanley.  He
believed that the Argentine Navy’s familiarity with United States strategy would lead
them to assume that such a landing would be made the American way, going straight
for the main target and relying on superior fire power to protect the landing force.
Looked at in this light, the events of April and May led up logically to this outcome.
30 So  the  actions  taken  by  the  task  force  commander  were  not  simply  the  carefully-
managed application of force in gradually increasing quantity in pursuit of a clearly-
identified  objective,  assumed  to  be  the  essentially  diplomatic  goal  of  Argentine
withdrawal and subsequent negotiations over ultimate sovereignty, but rather a full-
scale naval engagement. We now know that the order of events, and indeed the events
themselves, could have been quite different. It is believed that an Argentine submarine
fired a torpedo at a British ship on May 1, but failed. The following day, the Argentine
aircraft carrier Veinticinco de Mayo attempted to launch an airborne bombing attack
against British ships. That also failed, simply because the wind was not quite strong
enough  to allow  the  heavily  laden  bombers  to  take  off.  The  Argentine  air  force
attempted an Exocet attack that same day, using the same tactics, equipment and pilots
as on May 4 when HMS Sheffield was hit. A fault in the in-flight refuelling system meant
that the attack had to be abandoned. Argentine planes did attack the ships which were
bombarding  Port  Stanley,  but  the  bombs  missed.  So  the  first  ships  to  have  been
damaged in this battle could well have been British. Equally, we know that the Rules of
Engagement  at  the  end  of  April  allowed  for  attacks  against  the  Argentine  aircraft
carrier. But the submarine which had been shadowing the carrier lost contact with it.
Otherwise, it might well have been sunk before the Belgrano.
31 It would be tedious to pursue any further this ultimately pointless exercise in counter-
factual history. It does however, I believe, emphasise the fact that the events of the
opening days of May cannot be explained in terms of a controlled gradual escalation.
Interpreting the facts which were reported (or, to be more precise, were announced by
the British government) as unjustifiable escalation, in the case of the Belgrano, and as
retaliation,  in the case of  the Sheffield,  is  very much wide of  the mark and gives  a
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completely misleading picture of what was really going on. The Belgrano was sunk as
part  of  a  British policy  of  forcing the Argentine navy permanently  out  of  the  seas
around the Falklands, so that the Navy could fulfil its mission to prepare the way for a
landing, and the Sheffield was hit during an Argentine attempt to strike a decisive blow
against the Royal Navy while it was, or so the Argentine forces had been manoeuvred
into believing, at its most vulnerable. The order in which these two events occurred
was to a large extent fortuitous.
32 The  facts,  then,  cannot  speak  for  themselves.  The  events  can  only  be  accurately
represented if the framework in which they occur is also understood. In the particular
example of the events of May 1 to May 4 1982, it is perfectly clear that the framework
could not have been made public. The commander of the Task Force could hardly have
set out to spin a web of deception (his own words) and then tell the media. And there is
nothing unusual in war about the use of surprise and disinformation. It is salutary to
remember this at a time when providers of news still claim that events can be brought
to you directly by means of new technologies. It is partly true, but only to a very limited
extent. Speed is no substitute for depth.
33 So  merely  relating  ‘facts’ –  insofar  as  they  are  available –  without  the  explanatory
narrative is misleading, if not downright wrong. The facts without the background can
be seriously misconstrued and therefore misrepresented.
 
The pictorial record
34 One of the remarkable features of war reporting in the South Atlantic was the dearth of
visual images, both video and photographs. What video footage there was only reached
television screens between 10 and 23 days after it was filmed. The result was that by the
time the television pictures were shown the war itself had moved on to a new phase
and this  sharply  diminished the impact  of  the pictures  which eventually  did reach
people’s homes.5
35 Even still pictures were relatively few and far between and significantly delayed. In all
202 photographs were sent back during the conflict. A substantial proportion of those
taken in the early days of the campaign show ships sailing southwards over the vast
ocean. Apart from a few obvious technological features the pictures could have come
directly from a Second World War collection or from a film such as The Cruel Sea. One of
the best photographs of that period shows the military matériel – helicopters and other
equipment – being prepared under the main deck of the aircraft-carrier HMS Hermes.
The picture is remarkable not because it is an accurate representation of the hectic
work being done to organise the hastily-assembled stores on board the ships of the task
force but because it is a strangely beautiful picture suggesting a certain serene order. In
this respect the picture could remind one of debates over war art during the Second
World War in which some artists’ work was criticised for seeking to impose a sense of
order on events which were in fact essentially chaotic.
36 The first picture to be transmitted from land facilities – with remarkable speed – was a
picture of a British soldier drinking a mug of tea which has obviously been given to him
by liberated Falklanders at Goose Green who smile gratefully at the camera. The picture
fits into a convention of war pictures which has a long pedigree. The photographer
Tom Smith was apparently surprised – and even irritated – that of all the pictures he
had taken on the Falklands this was the one which the newspapers were most keen to
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publish. There was also some criticism on the part of the newspapers that this picture
was clearly given pride of place by the authorities and sent back to London with almost
indecent  haste.  Asked  about  this  during  the  enquiry,  the  Ministry said,  rather
disingenuously, that they had thought the newspapers would be keen to print it. Since
it was practically the first shot out of the Falklands after the landing this was indeed
the case, but it would have been so for almost any picture. The authorities were quite
clearly seeking to project an image of what the armed forces was doing on the islands
with which they were comfortable.
37 Other  photographs  which  were  later  to  assume  an  almost  iconic  status  were  less
popular  with  the  authorities,  the  most  evocative  example  of  which  was  Martin
Cleaver’s photograph of the explosion of HMS Antelope. Transmission of the picture was
undoubtedly delayed, but it became an instant success with the newspapers. It has been
suggested that this is at least in part because it meets a Robert Capa-like quest for a
photograph of the moment of death – when the ship exploded the two bomb disposal
experts who were trying to defuse the bomb were killed instantly. The photograph also
fitted nicely within a tradition of naval art: the moment of spectacular destruction as
part of a naval engagement (even if in this case the final explosion took place well after
the attack which had placed the bomb deep inside the ship).
38 Pictures of the fighting for the hills overlooking Stanley (and particularly pictures of
soldiers anxiously installing a saline drip for one of their seriously injured comrades)
echoed images from previous conflicts. So did some of the photographs taken of the
end of the hostilities (particularly the photographs showing piles of Argentine weapons
taken from prisoners of war).
39 It seems fairly evident that pictures were taken or published not so much to represent
the ‘reality’  of  the Falklands conflict  as  to locate the war within a narrative which
would be familiar to readers and encouraged by the authorities.
 
What is a war artist supposed to represent?
40 The Imperial  War  Museum commissioned Linda Kitson to  be  the  official  war  artist
accompanying the task force.  A director at  the museum had been impressed by an
exhibition of her sketches he had just seen and felt she could grasp quickly the essence
of events. Perhaps it is significant in this respect that there was immense uncertainty
at the outset as to whether the task force would in the end be anything more than a
show of strength to support negotiations. In short, the official war artist might have
ended up without a war to represent.
41 Linda Kitson’s drawings attracted quite a lot of criticism, some of which focused on the
apparently  ‘unfinished’  nature  of  her  work.  Apparently  one  disappointed  officer
remarked, no doubt sarcastically, that ‘they might be better when she has time to colour
them in’.6 According to Tom Wilcox, in a chapter in Framing the Falklands War entitled,
‘ ’We are All Falklanders Now’: Art, War and National Identity’, ‘the press was evidently
unimpressed by Kitson’s work, though picking up on her own description of her drawings as
“squiggles”’.7
42 There was a fundamental reason why Kitson’s work did not attract unanimous support.
It failed to conform to pre-established views of what war art should be about:
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A ‘running record’ of the war (as Kitson described it) which avoided both evident
acts of heroism or [sic] images of blood and guts was considered to be ‘drastically
uninformative in terms both of emotional mood and technical content’. Expecting
either condemnation or sensationalism, the engagement with the everyday life of
the Task Force which Kitson’s drawings reveal was largely left out of discussion in
the press.8
43 Kitson thought hard about what it  was she was supposed to be doing and how she
would go about doing it. She wholeheartedly adopted the philosophy of the war artist
as it was intended right from the start. Photographs, it had been felt in earlier conficts,
could never grasp the rapidity of events in war, and only the artist in the field could
adequately represent the unfolding events. Kitson set out to be such an artist in the
field, drawing, as quickly as she could, the scenes she witnessed: she writes of the tough
environment in which she had to work, sketching what she saw with cold hands in
woollen mittens.
44 She also thought very explicitly about whether her job was to portray the horror of
war:
At Goose Green, I had to make a decision about what aspects of war I should record.
My brief was to record the sights that might be recognised as common experiences.
I decided then that the horrifying sight of parts of human bodies, a helmet with a
head still in it – pictorially relevant though they were – were not part of my brief;
neither  were  the  war  graves,  which  were  recorded  on  news  film  and  in
photographs.  I  still  question  that  decision.  Would  it  have  been  a  stronger,
cautionary record if I had used such tactics?9
45 Many of her pictures show groups of men in more or less chaotic environments, poring
over maps, sending signals, servicing equipment, relaxing, drilling, training or lying in
hospital beds. Ms Kitson travelled in the QE2 and some of her pictures reflect the often
incongruous  juxtaposition  of  heavy  weapons  and  the  perfume  shop  or  the  signals
squadron and intelligence service and the hairdressing salon of the hastily-converted
luxury liner. Other sketches show helicopters and landing craft. Once she had landed
on the Falklands she drew pictures  of  helicopters  ferrying supplies  to  and fro,  the
makeshift living quarters, the POW camps, command posts, men in trenches and the
aftermath  of  battles  with  the  tangled  wreckage  of  Argentine  planes,  helicopters
evacuating casualties and the spectacular fire on the Sir Galahad after the air attack
which killed fifty-one men and wounded hundreds more. She drew sketches of military
vehicles of all kinds and of the guns, ammunition and equipment collected from the
Argentine  forces  after  the  cease  fire.  The  most  common  theme  is  men  working
hectically, often at tables with maps or typewriters or communications equipment, or
men relaxing or generally milling around, talking, working, resting. There are however
no pictures of battles taking place: but then she was not present or able to see much
fighting; and the kind of warfare which characterised the Falklands campaign did not
lend itself to real-time sketches.
46 The disappointment – or more or less muted criticism – generated by Linda Kitson’s
drawings  can  be  explained  by  the  fact  that  by  commenting  on  the  relatively
commonplace they did not correspond to the narrative of war that her critics wanted
to see brought to life in the work of the official war artist.
47 Some ‘unofficial war artists’ were clearly disappointed that they were not selected to
sail with the fleet and seem to suggest that they would have done a better job of it. One
who certainly appears to have felt like this (though he never says so explicitly) is David
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Cobb, an accomplished painter with a long history of work for and with the Navy as a
sailor and then an artist. He had only just opened an exhibition of war art when the
conflict  broke  out.  He  was  very  keen  to  record  as  much  as  he  could  of  the  naval
preparations  and the  departure  of  the  ships.  Although his  view is  laid  out  in  very
carefully  measured terms it  does  not  seem unreasonable  to  infer  from the way he
describes his role in his book The Making of a War Artist that he was disappointed: after
recalling how he had spent his life painting pictures of naval engagements, and had
indeed served in the Royal Navy, while Linda Kitson, despite her family connections,
clearly had not, he writes, ‘though I was carrying out the duty of one, I had no appointment as
an official War Artist (Linda Kitson was to have that honour)’.10
48 David Cobb travelled to the Falklands after the end of the conflict with the help of the
RAF, Army and Navy and given a number of commissions to paint pictures of some of
the major events of the war, particularly by the Royal Navy. For Cobb art can do much
more than photography, by setting events in their context:
… events in war do not oblige photographers, television teams or anyone else; the
more distant the subject the less effective the photography seemed to become. To
me, at least, it snuffed out past and future, space behind and movement beyond the
border of the picture. The ships were set in concrete waves, with spray stuck in
mid-air;  the  tramping  soldier’s  boot  would  never  reach  the  ground;  the  mists
around the mountains were fixed in place.11
49 Before he left for the Falklands he spent a lot of time with servicemen who had taken
part in the actions he wanted to recreate on paper or canvas and tried to sketch out
with  them  their  perception  of  what  had  happened,  modifiying  or  redrawing  the
sketches in response to their perceptions. It becomes clear from reading his account of
the way he worked to produce his paintings of the campaign that he was involved in
recreation as much as representation.  What he painted had to ‘fit’  with a view, based
apparently on prior knowledge and experience, combined with extensive interviews
with  participants  and  visits  to  the  locations  themselves.  Some  places  could  be
disappointing in this respect. For example he writes that ‘the exact site and function of
Ascension Island was crucial but not, unfortunately, really pictorial’.12
50 His paintings are very much part of a tradition of war art, and particularly naval war
art,  which  stretches  back  at  least  to  the  18th century.  It  is  undoubtedly  this
characteristic of his work, along with the very careful attention to detail, which has
made him a popular artist among the armed services, and many of his canvases now
hang in  officers’  messes  and other  places  in  military  establishments.  His  work was
certainly popular with Admiral of the Fleet Lord Lewin, who wrote in the introduction
to The Making of a War Artist:
With meticulous research, drawing on his feel for the sea, experience of battle and
the  Falklands  terrain  and  using  his  considerable  artistic  skill,  David  Cobb  has
depicted and described great events in such a way that those who were there will
say ‘That is exactly how it was’.  All aspects are covered, sea, land and air, from
hopeful departure for the unknown through hard-fought action and vital support
to triumphal homecoming … Those of us who were left ‘abed in England’ can be
assured; this is how it must have been.13
51 Admiral  Lewin  presents  the  process  of  showing  ‘exactly  how  it  was’  as  if  it  was
unproblematic,  but  it  clearly  is  not.  Apart  from  anything  else  there  is  a  curious
contradiction in what he writes: either it ‘was exactly’ or it ‘must have been’ as David
Cobb depicts it,  but it  cannot really be both.  The second formulation suggests very
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clearly that a form of mental reconstruction was at work, and that would have to be
rooted in probably unarticulated assumptions about what ‘exactly how it was’.
52 So,  as  with the  photographs published in  the press,  it  would certainly  appear  that
pictorial  representation  of  the  Falklands  War  was  subjected  to  the  pressures  of
consistency with a pre-existing ‘style’.  Many artists,  and many photographers,  were
looking  for  something  in  the  events  of  the  war  which  they  could  then  represent
according to the established conventions of the genre.
53 In  an  article  published in  2000,  the  photographer  Gilles  Saussier  suggests  that
photographs taken by war reporters are like Russian dolls; they are presented as if they
were  a  condensed  version  of  the  events  themselves,  a  quintessence  of  historical
meaning, and yet in a sense they do no more than simply revisit the clichés of previous
wars,  drawing heavily on a long tradition of  Western art  and iconography updated
under the pretext of news:
Les photographies d’actualité sont pleines des cadavres ou des fantômes des images
qui les ont précédées … Les photographies de reportage sont des images-gigognes,
images  qui  se  donnent  pour  une  condensation  de  l’événement  lui-même,  un
concentré  de  signification  historique,  alors  qu’elles  sont  des  concentrés
iconographiques, réalisés au prétexte de l’information.14
54 In a collection of essays entitled Framing the Falklands War, James Aulich writes similarly
that the events of the war were narrated according to ‘safely predictable narratives’,15 and
that ‘the contemporary representation of the Task Force was situated firmly in mythological and




55 There have been a number of pictures or collages made since the end of the conflict,
not by ‘war artists’, official or otherwise, but by critics of the war and, perhaps even
more importantly,  by Falklands veterans trying to cope with the trauma they have
experienced since their return and finding in art a way of expressing their feelings and
emotions.  Among the first  of  these two categories of  artists  there are a number of
pictures suggesting that the war was an unnecessary one that served the interests of
certain politicians. Raymond Briggs, better known for his cartoon books and films for
children, used the medium of the children’s book to produce a savage criticism of both
Thatcher and Galtieri,  suggesting that the end result of a quarrel between a tin-pot
general and a hysterical Thatcher-figure was just a lot of broken people living on a land
made  largely  uninhabitable  by  the  debris  of  war.17 The  cartoonist  Ralph  Steadman
produced  a  cartoon,  printed  on  the  cover  of  the  New  Statesman,  which  similarly
presented – or represented – the Falklands war as a thoroughly unsavoury affair. His
cartoon shows two rotting stinking mutton chops, shaped in the form of a map of the
two large islands of the Falklands archipelago, attacked by swarms of belligerent flies.18
Other paintings suggest there was a nasty form of jingoism over the conflict.
56 The art exhibited in Manchester in the late 1980s,  mainly produced by veterans on
post-traumatic  stress  therapy,  mostly  casts  doubt  on  the  motives  behind  the  war,
questioning whether the suffering it caused was in any way justified. It is mostly sad
and often bitter. These alternative visions remained very much a minority, however,
drowned  out  by  those  representations  which  reflected  more  conventional
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interpretations of the meaning of the conflict, closer to those expressed by Margaret
Thatcher in the now-famous speech she gave at Cheltenham shortly after the conflict in
which she suggested that the war had shown that the ‘nation still  [had] those sterling
qualities which shine through our history’.19
 
Myths and heroes
57 There  is  of  course  a  long  tradition  of  representing  war  in  terms  of  the  myth  of
individual  heroism. In talking about myths,  I  want to be absolutely clear that I  am
referring to the way Roland Barthes used the term in Mythologies and Angus Calder
applied it to the history of wartime Britain in The Myth of the Blitz. This emphatically
does not mean that the events which may or may not have entered into mythology are
untrue: I am not approaching this question in terms of a dialectic between ‘myth and
reality’. Calder finds it useful:
that many of us now understand ‘myth’ as a relevant term in discussion of apparent
trivialities, like car design or magazine covers, obviously auratic phenomena like
the charisma of film stars and politicians, and the projection of events such as the
Falklands crisis.20
58 The Falklands war, like any other conflict, has its heroes. The best-known of these is Lt.
Colonel Herbert Jones of the Parachute Regiment, who died during the battle of Goose
Green.  Almost  universally  referred to  in  the media  as  ‘H’  Jones,  he  was shot  while
charging forward and attacking enemy positions at extreme risk to himself at a point in
the battle when the momentum of the British advance seemed to be faltering. For this
act of great bravery he was awarded the Victoria Cross.
59 There was a second soldier to win the VC in the Falklands, also posthumously. However
his  heroic  action was given less  coverage than that  of  ‘H’  Jones.  Sergeant Ian John
McKay, also of the Parachute regiment, died on the attack along Mount Longdon on the
night of June 11/12, also losing his life in an attempt to ensure that the momentum of
the battle was sustained at a crucial time. The reason why his name is much less well-
known has nothing to do with the extent of his bravery but everything to do with the
time at which his actions took place and the consequent lower-key media focus on him:
news  of  his  bravery  came  in  almost  at  the  same  time  as  news  of  the  Argentine
surrender and consequently his story was less conspicuous.
60 Both ‘H’ Jones and Ian John McKay were killed while performing acts of gallantry which
remind one of so many more acts of heroism for which men and women have been
decorated in previous conflicts. The stories are very much of the kind celebrated in the
‘war  comics’  which  were  once  popular,  so  much  so  that  many  people  have  seen
something of the spirit of the Boys’ Own Paper in these courageous actions. This does not
make them any the less  real,  and it  does make the actions concerned any the less
genuinely  heroic.  It  does  however emphasise  that  narratives  of  war have a  certain
momentum of their own.
61 Another  man  to  have  been  recognised  for  his  bravery  is  a  Welsh  Guard  who  was
seriously injured during the attack on the Sir Galahad. Simon Weston was very badly
burnt during the attack and had the courage to speak about his  injuries  in public,
showing his dreadfully disfigured face on television as part of a campaign to collect
funds for charity. For this quiet bravery he has won the admiration of the public and is
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a very popular figure.  His  is  perhaps a  rather different form of  bravery and it  has
certainly touched the public’s imagination.
62 Of course there were many other brave men and women who played a number of very
different roles during the campaign and after. The reason why I recall the way in which
certain  people  have  been  so  publicly  identified  is  heroes  is  that  narratives  of  war
consistently highlight outstanding individuals: this process is an integral part of the
representation of any conflict and seems necessary to bring the confused and large-
scale story of conflict into sharp focus.
 
Conclusions
63 Clearly representation involves much more than merely recalling ‘events’ for a reader,
listener  or  viewer  who was  not  actually  there  when the  events  involved  occurred.
Representation is very much about interpretation, about meaning, about making sense
of things and about ‘showing’ things in a form which makes them ‘real’. The meaning of
the  Falklands  conflict  was,  and  still  is,  an  area  of  some  controversy.  Was  it  an
opportunity for Britain to show to the world that she had not lost her spirit or was it an
unnecessary conflict precipitated by a series of political blunders? Was it another ‘fine
hour’ to be proud of and remembered or was it just the cause of needless pain for many
of  the  participants?  And  was  it  an  important  moment  when  certain  values  were
reasserted or was it simply a blip in history, something that does not really fit in with
the big picture of  20th century Britain? Was it  just  a  curious throwback to the 19 th
century or was it a defining moment in postwar British history? All of these conflicting
or contrasting views have been expressed at one time or another over the last twenty
or thirty years.
64 Answers  to  these  questions  will  to  a  large  extent  pre-determine  representations.
Perhaps the unsettled nature of the debate explains why cinema seems largely to have
ignored the Falklands. Perhaps the shortage of visual memories of the conflict means
that there is no common pool of images to draw from to construct a narrative with
which people could identify. Perhaps, too, the doubts about the real meaning of the
conflict mean that it is not a subject which lends itself easily to any sort of historical
reconstruction for mass audiences.
65 Beyond all of this there is the fact that the Falklands conflict was so rapidly superseded
by  other  far  more  momentous  events  which  have  meant  that  debate  about  its
significance became relatively pointless. Its meaning in the context of the Cold War, as
an expression of Britain’s will to respond to armed aggression and thus give substance
to the crucial concept of deterrence, was soon deprived of much of its importance when
the Soviet Union collapsed and the whole idea of deterrence changed completely. And
while it is true that the meaning of the conflict has been contested, the debate is vastly
less intense than that over more recent military engagements, especially in Iraq. Even
the nature of warfare seems, though this may be more a question of appearance than
reality, to have moved on so far and so quickly that the Falklands conflict appears to
belong to a past which is of only limited relevance today. Representations of recent
conflicts  have  emphasised  the  role  of  ‘smart’  weapons,  missiles  capable  of  striking
identified  targets  with  awe-inspiring  accuracy.  The  war  in  the  South  Atlantic,  by
contrast, seems to belong to another world, with soldiers fighting with their bayonets
and warships steaming into battle, both recalling representations of the Second, if not
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the First, World War. This is almost certainly an illusion but undoubtedly one which
shaped representations.
66 Most images adopted artistic and photographic conventions based on the discourses or
narratives of previous conflicts, though these expectations were frustrated when for
example the official war artist failed to produce what some people would consider to be
the ‘right’  sort  of  pictures.  Those  representational  conventions  were  challenged by
people who questioned the raison d’être of the conflict, especially those who suffered
personally as a consequence. The Falklands War is therefore in many respects a case
study of a conflict which shows just how much representation can be both ideological
and contested.
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ABSTRACTS
The Falklands conflict was particularly remote and direct individual experience correspondingly
rare. At the same time public interest in the conflict was intense. The events of the South Atlantic
raise  a  number  of  important  questions  about  the  extent  to  which  a  distant  confict  can  be
‘represented’. Even at a very basic level of representation, it is clear that the facts cannot speak
for themselves: without context bare facts can be misleading. In art and photography, it becomes
obvious that representations are shaped according to pre-existing patterns. And like all previous
conflicts, the Falklands War saw the projection of heroic narratives, recalling representations of
previous conflicts.
Le conflit des Malouines s’est déroulé à l’autre bout du monde et peu de personnes pouvaient en
avoir  une  expérience  directe.  Cependant  le  public  témoigna  d’un  intérêt  intense  pour  ces
événements  lointains,  qui  posent  des  questions  fondamentales  sur  la  possibilité  même  de
représenter un conflit. Même au niveau le plus élémentaire de la repésentation, il est clair que les
faits ne parlent pas d’eux-mêmes : sans le contexte, les faits bruts peuvent être trompeurs. Quant
aux représentations artistiques et photographiques, il devient clair que les représentations sont
élaborées en fonction de cadres pré-existants. Enfin, comme tous les conflits qui l’ont précédé, le
conflit des Malouines a vu l’émergence de récits héroïques, là encore rappelant la façon dont les
conflits antérieurs furent narrés.
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